Monday, February 20, 2012

Activation and direct emotion generation


If by definition, the title of “User Experience” indicates catering to users' emotion responses, “activation" can help in understanding the principles of emotion generations. In his ground-breaking work on affective reasoning (Elliot, 1992), Elliot summarizes the emotion generation based on his previous studies. Taking the direct emotions for illustration, when an agent perceives a potential relevance with a situation, the frames including the goals, standards and preferences (GSP) are matched against the eliciting situation frame. If a match is established, the situation is officially the agent’s concern in the form of construals. The working memory determines the matching success rate in that the agent must retrieve information for GSP. Bindings take place in the left hemisphere when the situation frame slots marry the variables in slots of construal frame from the previous phase, then an emotion eliciting condition relation (EECR) is created for each construal of that situation. Because there may be many interpretations of a situation, there are multiple EECRs to be confirmed individually and gathered together by involved agent. In the following step, compound-emotions EECRs are formed from the separation and recombination of the event-based construals and attribution-based construals. The prospect results will work with the domain-independent rules to generate an emotion instance such as hope.  From my understanding, a basic underlying activity is activation, for instance, the matching process depends on working memory, and we have covered the meaning of activation to working memory earlier. The same story may happen to binding as well, because there are intensive computations to analyze and integrate frame slots of two different resources.

For instance, if a scenario tells us a group of users are more likely to be frustrated under a circumstance, what can a designer do to make users feel emotionally easier?  We can manipulate some variables to suppress activation in the working memory. Imaging a busy Mom standing in front of an airline kiosk with two playful little boys, she may have developed a prospect-base emotion of fear already, as she can construe the situation based on existing frame slots gained from latest experience in relation to her goal, standards and preferences. In this case, designers can either employ a quick interface walk-through demo as a light tutorial when users are still in waiting areas, or adjust environmental variables such as lighting and private space, as long as those measures help diminish the chance of activation. 



Figure 2: the mapping structure from situation to emotion (Elliot 1992)

I agree that the above theoretical framework is hard to validate, but it is still a good model to look at. As HCI practitioners, we do not have to be "addicted" to a particular theory, or over-criticize it. A well-shaped science mind is good in terms of understanding design solutions as the inputs to human brain.

Reference:
Elliott, C. D., & Northwestern University. (1992). The affective reasoner: A process model of emotions in a multi-agent system. Evanston, Il: Northwestern University 

(© 2012 Miaoqi Zhu)

Friday, February 10, 2012

When the reality tells me the "feeling" is wrong


I was on the north-bound train almost approaching my destination; an idea suddenly came to my mind, why did I feel the train is heading to a different direction at this time comparing to the time when I was aboard.

There is no doubt that the train is driving to North; otherwise, I may never get back home. Having this assumption in mind that the train is right, I began recalling the scenario in which I got aboard from Adam/Wabash. This does not sound like a very difficult task; however, here are a few things making it more complicated than expected:
 
  1. The stop where I departed is underground, thus there are a few clues for me to get a sense where the train is going. In other words, the sort of survey knowledge I established before cannot take effect here, at least for me; 
  2. The entry of a particular station: specifically, for those stations with centered platform, there are typically two entries located on two sides. If a passenger going North enter from the north gate,  since there are two floors, she or he need to turn around to catch the Northbound train once reaching the platform, vice versus;  
  3. The seats are placed towards to two directions. One is with where the training is driving to, while the other is the opposite. Having said that, there could be another couple of mental rotations to carry out;
  4. The train's door opening at either sides depending on the design of station platform.

When the first factor is relatively independent, another three in fact has certain interactions. Imaging you are heading to North: you firstly enter the station from the South gate, which means that you don’t have to turn around; fortunately, when the trains arrives, after boarding from the right-side door, you decide to use the seats on the right is following train’s direction, in this case, you  may feel less striving to recognize the direction. Nevertheless, if you get into the train through the left door and decide to sit on the left side where those seats are facing backward, it might add extra work for the agent in terms of figuring out where s/he is going to. If you start from an above-ground station, the puzzle could be even easier to resolve, because you have a number of visual clues to reference such as landmarks.

Having listed the possible noises preventing me from feeling right for the direction, I continue recalling each scene from the time to enter the station to board the train. Since I am more type of visual thinker, I enjoy playing back every single memory frame. The first challenge was presented because of the internal construction structure of the station, it is important in that the number of turns along with its direction co-determine my actual orientation in the world. I resolve this problem by putting myself in an imaginary blueprint of the station, and re-experiencing the journey virtually in head. Then the second challenge follows because I have to map the spatial relationship between my seat and the door from which I got in. Please be aware each cart has two doors on one side, which means that if I sit closer to the door where I boarded, it will be easier; but if I choose a seat that is further away, or if I don’t remember which door I entered, it would be another story.

Finally, I got the “feeling” corrected by reasoning the spatial relationships among each object that I am able to recall. Further, playing back the scenario is helpful in terms of structuring the space I was in before. A big question here is that: why did I lose the feeling of direction in the first place? I mean when the train is operating underneath, the feeling is alright; yet once the train drives out of the tunnel, I became a little anxious since my intuition tells me that feeling is incorrect. I was also surprised by how many chunks of information and attention resources I have employed to get that feeling fixed, let alone the intensive computations occurring in my head. Every time I spare a little attention for other activities (e.g. talking to friends), I may need to restart the process again, because a sub-process generates so much data that needs to be temporarily stored in working memory for the next thread of computation(s).


(© 2012 Miaoqi Zhu)

Sunday, February 5, 2012

Activation


When I was in the “flow” state of reading Anderson’s paper of “ACT A Simple Theory of Complex Cognition”, I could not help myself referring back to Just and Carpenter’s seminar work on capacity theory of comprehension. I am wondering perhaps there is a connection between two theories, which is the “Activation-Level”.

First of all, just a little recap of Anderson’s paper: He tries to understand the basic components and processing principles of our cognition. By studying how people write recursive programs, he claims that there are two elements: productions (procedural knowledge) and long-term chunks (declarative knowledge). Then he further explains what are “Knowledge Acquisition” and “Knowledge Deployment”.

For “Knowledge Acquisition”, it was said that long term chunks come from environment encoding, and to transform those chunks, ACT-R looks for some existing chunks for mapping; From “Knowledge Deployment”, the author answers the question: how humans select the most appropriate knowledge for a particular context. Based on a rational analysis that “knowledge is made available according to its odds of being used in a particular context, activation process implicitly performs a Bayesian inference in calculating these odds”, he elicits a basic equation, which is:


Activation_Level = Base_level + Contextual_Priming

Anderson further illustrates this equation with three domains; memory, categorization, and problem solving.  It looks to me that for those three domains, the way we see “contextual priming” slightly differs. For instance, for memory, it is the association of chunk n and chunk m; for problem-solving, it is about the effect of distance to the goal that participants set up. 

When we go back to Just and Carpenter’s paper: they “redefine” the concept of working memory by presenting a computational theory, which suggests both storage and processing are fueled by an identical property called “Activation”. More specifically, each element (e.g. word, phrase, objects from real world) carries an associated activation level. During a course of understanding, relevant chunks are activated from either a computation or long term memory; however, not all of them can enter working memory; only the one that meets certain minimum threshold value obtain the permission. As long as the total amount of activation level is within system limitation, we are good to process the information; but if the sum exceeds system limitation, we need to de-allocate some old elements. It may be not hard to get the idea if you draw a scenario in which you try to understand a difficult sentence with several clauses embedded. Some people with large working memory capacity may understand it quicker than those who own a small capacity.

You may notice that the activation level is a common thread for both works. If Anderson is right, can he help explain where the activation level from in Just and Carpenter’s theory? Just and Carpenter adopt assess working memory capacity using the "Reading-Span" task; while Anderson address his curiosity from studying people writing recursive programs, and his idea is published a few years after. I am just wondering if we swap their methodologies, are we still seeing this common thread?



Reference:

Anderson, J. R. (1996). ACT: A simple theory of complex cognition. American Psychologist, 51, 355-365.

Just, M. A., Carpenter, P.A., (1992). Capacity Theory of Comprehension: Individual Differences in Working Memory. Psychological Review, 99(1), 122-149.

(© 2012 Miaoqi Zhu)

Friday, February 3, 2012

Sing a song


I have kept asking myself this question: why I feel using just a little effort to remember a whole piece of lyrics after I recall the first or first few words? 

When I am reading the book written by Dr. Lawrence Barsalou, specifically the Chapter 6 dedicated to “long-term memory” encoding, I found the above question partially addressed. I admit that a person may listen to a song many times; as basically, she/he must very much enjoy it for some reason. In that sense, the amount of processing on the lyrics is improved by presentation duration, the chances to rehearse, and the number of presentations. Those three variables are found to be the significant factors determining the information processing quality. 

What appears more interesting to me is the sort of elaboration that contributes to data encoding: first, incidental versus intentional learning. Human beings are in fact ready to encode any information without "realizing" it. Although there is a benefit for us to try to remember something, because it may result in increasing number of rehearsals, but it is not fair to say that the information cannot be learned well, because people are not inducing to do so.  When we are listening to a favorite song, of course, it is fine for us to try hard to remember the lyrics word by word, but let us think about it again, how many times you found yourself practicing the song perfectly without the intention to memorize. Second, the depth of information processing. If you are given a stimulus such as a car’s engine part that you have never seen before, how can you restore it? Well, ideally, you may develop a set of characteristics pertaining to that objective stimulus, with those characteristics becoming more conceptual, the stimulus will be remembered better. In fact, when you try to recall that stimulus later, the previous generated conceptual information will be activated and retrieved as well. Applying this point to explaining my question, each word in the lyrics relates to another, and they come together to form a meaning that musicians want to convey. I can say I still recall a song easily from a decade ago, as it is my favorite one from my favorite show. When I retrieve the lyrics, I can still perceive its meaning to the show. In addition, I am wondering whether the rhythm helps extending the depth, although it is different type of information, the phonological loop could be affected by it, as we sing out individual word with the sound. Third, imagery, in other word, you can visualize the information, which may produce more conceptual information to elaborate. For example, you are asked to remember “subway airport”, then you can picture a scene that “a CTA blue line subway is heading to the Chicago O’Hare airport.” It does not have to be that rich decorations attached to the original materials, yet we see an improvement in remembering. Again, going back to my question of interest, as I said before, I am able to play back a portion of the show (e.g. the main characters get back together), as the lyrics correspond to the story quite well; in the meanwhile, some words can be transformed to real objects (e.g. river, horse)  from the show. 

The reason why my question is partially un-addressed at this point is that: are the lyrics stored as a whole in a chunk? or divided into several chunks with some special “linkage”? Because when we succeed in recalling or recognizing the first one or two word, the rest is usually flowing out like a river. Perhaps people will say it is up to individual depending on her or his capacity and strategy to encode information. :)


Reference:

Lawrence W. Barsalou. (1992) Cognitive Psychology, An overview for Cognitive Scientists , Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. ISBN 0-89859-966-0


(© 2012 Miaoqi Zhu)

A few words from many years ago


I have been intrigued by a comment from my Mom’s colleague when I was in China last month, after about 5 years since I saw her last time. She can still remember a joke that I said over 10 years ago. Although she tried to make fun of me by quoting that phrase, I started contemplating about a question arisen by the instance: why human being can recall a tiny piece of information about a person after such a long time.

After reading the capacity paper (Just et al., 1992), I am aware of its theory about the activation on information processing and storage, but when it comes to retrieve information from long term memory, despite the low-span or large-span people’s capacity differences in terms of working memory, does element/item in long term memory carry activation level? If so, will the activation also mediate the process, thus affect the outcomes?

I have come across three models pertaining to information retrieval from long-term memory , and it seems that “matching” is a key word for all of them. For example, imaging the information seeking process resembles the scenario of searching for your bags at luggage claim, you are going to examine each matching item until the first piece is found, then the entire process starts over again. There is also another one called Resonance Retrieval Theory that treats information as a vector with elements representing different conceptual subjects.

Let me propose this: people may tend to organize or categorize long term chunks according to a specific object such as a pet, a friend, etc.  Each item appears like a vector with an equal number of attributes as long as that person put them into the identical category.

Element CategoryHuman_Male_001111 = { A[0], A[1], A[2] …. A[n-3], A[n-1]), A[n-1] }

The attribute can be an individual element such as hair color, relationship status, education degree, etc. However, they are assigned with different weights due to the product of external stimulus and the person’s strategy to encode information. There is an pointer that always waits at the first attribute- A[0], while the first attribute is reserved to any elements bearing the most substantial weight. That being said, they are changeable, because any attributes can be strengthened or weakened by various events, and this process may be done by an unknown internal mechanism. Thus, when the working memory calls for information activated by means of retrieving and decoding items/elements from long term memory, the weight of the candidate may affect the efficiency of the process, and I would like to name the weight as activation level for each information unit in long term memory. 

The above model/process is just my "random" thought, I am looking forward to reading more literature to see it is "correct" or the opposite. :)

Reference:
Wickens, C. (1980). The structure of attentional resource. In R. Nickerson (ed.), Attention and Performance VIII, 239-257, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.


(© 2012 Miaoqi Zhu)